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Abstract
Th is paper focuses on a topical issue – the idea of ‘justice in education’ – developed by Krassimir Stojanov, 
among other recent educational justice theorists. Justice in education has to ask ‘educational questions about 
education’, which means that educational justice theory should be capable of dealing with educational prac-
tices, and constellations that are asymmetrical interaction orders. Th is requires, from the perspective of a 
child, criteria to distinguish between justiﬁ ed and unjustiﬁ ed educative demands towards responsibility and 
autonomy. Th is paper analyses forms of recognition as a legitimate summons that enables the individual’s 
autonomy. It also analyses the illegitimate demands that emerge from Stojanov’s innovative idea to combine 
the forms of misrecognition with the concepts of epistemic injustice.
 Th e second chapter of this paper introduces the challenges related to the recognitive justice as justice in 
education. Th e examination of Dietrich Benner’s recent critique of recognition theory illuminates these chal-
lenges in two ways: ﬁ rst, it is shown that there can be something negatively experienced, but the result of 
productive disruptions that the educator need to produce, which are out of the scope of recognition theory. 
Second, the recognitive justice paradigm ignores elementary pedagogical conditions and requirements, ‘the 
pedagogical knowledge’ and its methods, and is therefore unable to fully grasp the legitimate educational 
authority. Th is paper concludes with a synthesis that ﬁ nds the crucial elements from the recognition theory 
to justice in education and critically assessing Benner’s claims. Overall, the paper oﬀ ers potential for further 
development in justice in education.
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Introduction
Th e educational philosopher, Krassimir Stojanov, has recently studied questions concer-
ning educational justice and extends these questions even into the area of immigration 
education.1 Stojanov elaborates the mainstream educational justice theories by combining 
three historically formed discourses on social justice: the distributive, suﬃ  cientarian and 
recognitive justice paradigms.2 Th is paper focuses on the speciﬁ c form of educational justice, 
1 Krassimir Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational migration,” Journal of Global Ethics 14, no. 1 (Aug. 2018): 
34–46, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/17449626.2018.1498370.
2 In these writings Stojanov characterises all these strands of justice as diﬀ erent kinds of egalitarianism: the distri-
butive justice paradigm is composed of John Rawls’ and Donald Dworkin’s justice theories as ‘luck egalitarianism’, 
while the participatory justice theory is characterised through Martha Nussbaum’s and Amy Gutmann’s capability 
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justice in education, which Stojanov, among other educational justice theorists,3 develops. 
Stojanov4 emphasises that the mainstream educational justice paradigms, have been one-
sidedly focused either on equal distribution of resources and opportunities for education, 
or opportunities as results of education. In other words, the emphasis has been either on 
justice for education or justice through education, while largely neglecting perspectives con-
cerning justice in education.
Th e theory of justice in education has to ask ‘educational questions about education’, 
which means questions concerning educational practices, and constellations that are asym-
metrical interaction orders. In other words, justice in education must anticipate to what 
degree we can hold children as immature beings responsible for their actions5 and how we 
can summon them towards autonomy. Th is requires criteria to distinguish the justiﬁ ed 
educational authority necessary for the good of the agent, well-being and autonomy, from 
the practices that reduce autonomy.6 Th is paper examines how well the recognitive justice 
paradigm can fulﬁ l these requirements of justice in education.
Th e ﬁ rst part of this paper deﬁ nes the four main criteria from Meira Levinson’s con-
ceptualisations of justice in education, in order to gain a better understanding of the term. 
Th is is followed by an examination of how Honneth and Stojanov can respond to these 
challenges. Th e three forms of recognition, love and empathy, rights and social esteem and 
the idea of friendship are studied as pedagogical summons or challenges that children need 
approaches as ‘minimalist egalitarianism’ and Axel Honneth’s recognitive justice paradigm as ‘respect egalitaria-
nism’. Th is paper agrees with Stojanov that the debates around these mainstream justice paradigms have not yet 
widely analyzed the idea of justice in education, while acknowledges that Stojanov’s distinctions are only rough 
paradigmatic lines. Th e debates on justice theories goes far deeper from these three paradigmatic lines with wide 
variety of diﬀ erent justice approaches. Th is paper does not oﬀ er a systematic account of the diﬀ erent variations of 
egalitarianism but limits its scope on Stojanov’s idea of justice in education.
3 John Calvert, “Educational Equality: Luck Egalitarian, Pluralist and Complex,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 
48, No. 1 (22 November 2013): 69–85, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12048; Johannes Drerup, “Th e Politics of 
the Level Playing ﬁ eld. Equality of Opportunities and Educational Justice,” in Justice, Education and the Politics of 
Childhood: Challenges and Perspectives, eds. Johannes Drerup, Gunter Graf, Christoph Schickhardt and Gottfried 
Schweiger (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016), 115–136; Johannes Giesinger, “Educational justice and 
the justiﬁ cation of education,” in Education, Justice and Th e Human Good. Fairness and Equality in the Education 
System, ed. Kirsten Meyer (Oxon, New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 65–79: Meira Levinson, “Th eorizing Educational 
Justice,” (Paper presented at the International Conference on Aﬀ ective, Moral, and Civic Education, University 
of Montreal, Canada 20-22 May 2015) 1–17, https://www.scribd.com/document/334362309/Levinson-Th eorizing-
Educational-Justice-CIDE.
4 Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational migration,” 35.
5 Stojanov in his “Educational justice and transnational migration”, 34, expresses this idea diﬀ erently by asking if 
there are justiﬁ ed inequalities in education and, if so, how we can distinguish them from unjustiﬁ ed ones. Th e 
assumption here would be that there would not be ‘deserved’ inequalities among schoolchildren.
6 Th e author of this paper is aware that these legitimate paternalistic rationales are deeply intertwined with the non-
paternalistic rationale aiming at (some) conception of the public good (Drerup 2016, 124; Levinson 2015, 1–17); cf. 
Immanuel Kant, On Education, Trans. Annette Churton. (Bristol: Th oemmes Press, 1992): 27. Honneth’s (2013; 2017) 
Freedom’s right and Th e idea of socialism contain highly impressive ideas for further development of these ‘the 
public good-aspects’. See e.g. Michael Nance, “Honneth’s Democratic Sittlichkeit and Market Socialism,” (paper 
presented at the conference on Anerkennung und Sozialismus at the Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main July 
18, 2014), 1–26; To investigate these societal elements of educational justice and the associated critiques would 
require another study. 
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progressively to learn to manage. Stojanov and Honneth underline the forms of recogni-
tion that are necessary to autonomy, the legitimate authority or ‘paternalism’ fostering the 
individual’s autonomy, and the reproduction of a democratic constitutional state.7 Th e last 
parts of the ﬁ rst chapter aim to outline the unfair and illegitimate (pedagogical) demands 
by discussing the connection between Stojanov’s, Fricker’s and Honneth’s ideas..8 Stojanov’s 
innovative attempt to connect Honneth’s forms of misrecognition, lack of empathy, denial 
of rights and denigration, with Fricker’s concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutic 
injustice (i.e. epistemic injustice) illuminates how injustice in education might occur and 
brings Honneth’s ‘abstract’ categories closer to the school world.
Secondly, this paper cites Dietrich Benner’s9 recent article ‘Über Anerkennung und 
Macht’ (About Recognition and Power) to introduce the challenges related to the position 
of justice in education. Two crucial points are elicited: a) Negative experiences play diﬀ e-
rent roles from those that Honneth attributes to these phenomena.10 Further examination 
will show that there could be negatively experienced but very useful educative summons 
necessary for justice in education that are out of the scope of the categories of epistemic 
injustice and misrecognition. b) Th e recognitive justice paradigm corresponds insuﬃ  ciently 
with the elementary pedagogical conditions and requirements, and is therefore unable to 
deﬁ ne the legitimate educational authority. Elaboration on this point introduces Benner’s 
ideas of ‘pedagogical knowledge’ and ‘the preparatory teaching in the scientiﬁ c thinking’ 
(den wissenschaftspropädeutischen Unterricht)11 to illustrate how the elementary pedago-
gical contents should be regarded in the pedagogical research and in schools.
   Th e conclusion of this paper summarises the results of this contemplation by critically 
amending the central points of the recognitive justice paradigm and evaluating the rele-
vance of Benner’s critical claims. It is argued that both perspectives, the elements of recog-
nition theory and pedagogical theory are necessary for the idea of justice in education and 
the synthesis of these views oﬀ ers avenues and relevant contents for further development 
of justice in education.
7 Axel Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere: A Neglected Chapter of Political Philosophy,” in 
Recognition and Freedom. Axel Honneth’s Political Th ought, eds. Jonas Jakobsen and Odin Lysaker (Leiden: Brill, 
2015), 24–25; Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egalitarianism,” 254–57.
8 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
Chapters 3, 9; Axel Honneth, Th e Struggle for Recognition: Th e Moral Grammar of Social Conﬂ icts. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995), 131–44.  
9 Dietrich Benner, “Über Anerkennung und Macht in pädagogischen Kontexten,” in: Zwischenwelten der Pädagogik, 
eds. Christiane Th ompson and Sabrina Schenk, (Leiden: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2017), 139–155. Benner is a 
well known German educational philosopher and developer of the general theory of education (Allgemeine Päda-
gogik), Bildung-theory, pedagogic action theory, school theory and didactics; see Benner, Allgemeine Pädagogik. 
Eine systematisch-problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die Grundstruktur pädagogischen Denkens und Handelns 
(Weinheim, München: Juventa Verlag, 2005).
10 Benner, “Über Anerkennung und Macht,“ 142; Andrea, R. English, Discontinuity in Learning. Dewey, Herbart, and 
Education as Transformation, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 17–21; cf. John Dewey, How we think: 
a restatement of the relation of reﬂ ective thinking to the educative process (Lexington, Mass.: D C Heath & Co, 1933).
11 Benner, “Über Anerkennung und Macht,“ 150.
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Justice in education and recognitive justice?
Justice in education faces a dilemma regarding the degree to which children as immature 
beings can be held as responsible for their actions; and what can and should be demanded 
and expected from them. Th is question contains multiple aspects that need to be dealt 
with. Meira Levinson, for example, deﬁ nes several signiﬁ cant perspectives that should be 
taken into consideration for justice in education. Firstly, Levinson states that any theory 
of educational justice must take account a child as a not-yet-compliant-and-reasonable 
being. Furthermore, the methods for fostering the abilities for reason and compliance are 
themselves an essential object of theorizing about educational justice. Secondly, Levinson 
contends that educational justice must deﬁ ne the just corrective acts and just distribution 
of educational goods, the reason being that a child is an incomplete being. Levinson cla-
riﬁ es that the educator must always consider how much time and attention is given to a 
particular student, (for example in the challenging cases) and thus education is always a 
distributive question (distribution of teaching time and attention). At the same time, the 
educator must consider what kind of discipline or ‘corrections’12 are justiﬁ ed in a student’s 
and whole class’s actions. Th irdly, Levinson argues that any theory of educational justice 
must oﬀ er an account of the school’s responsibilities. Th is means that educational justice 
should analyse the boundaries around the social construction of diﬀ erence by adjusting 
teaching to encounter the student’s incoming diﬀ erences and diﬀ erences in their educa-
tional outcomes and enable a reasonable mediation in children’s pathways between the 
two. Fourthly, Levinson states that educational justice should analyse the intermediated 
meanings of aims and practices of education. Levinson furthers that this aspect integrates 
micro-level (a class-room activities), meso-level (school and district) and macro-level per-
spectives (the societal aims and schools aims).13
Levinson’s criteria for justice in education are comprehensive and any attempt to deal 
all these aspects in a one educational justice theory could lead to ‘a bloated’ or ‘incoherent 
theory’. However, as this paper argues, Levinson’s distinctions crucially indicate how the 
idea of justice in education should be capable of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate, 
or fair from unfair, demands towards the responsibility and autonomy of a child. In other 
words, educational justice theory should contain the criteria to recognise unjust practices 
and those practices in education that undermine a child’s autonomy. Th is means criteria to 
distinct the right kind of corrections and appropriate aims of education.
Th e mainstream educational justice paradigms, as argued14 are failing to fulﬁ ll these 
demands. Th e distributive justice paradigm struggles with the problems of ‘levelling the 
playing ﬁ eld’, i.e., how to compensate students with diﬀ erent starting conditions and how 
12 Levinson in her “Th eorizing Educational Justice,”, 6–13, uses the term ‘corrections.’
13 Drerup, “Th e Politics of the Level Playing ﬁ eld,” 115–36; Stojanov, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, 27–67; Stojanov, “Educatio-
nal Justice as Respect Egalitarianism,” 249–60.
14 Giesinger, “Educational justice and the justiﬁ cation of education,” 65–79; Christopher Martin, “When the ideal of 
liberal egalitarianism meets the fact of austerity: reorienting philosophical perspectives on educational policy,” 
Journal of Education Policy, 30 no. 2 (June 2014): 201–219, https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2014.943297.
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to mitigate disadvantages resulting from ‘brute luck’. Th e distributive paradigm for its part 
remains silent about the contents and aims of education (the substance questions) and the 
quality of pedagogic interaction in schools.15
Th e participatory justice or suﬃ  cientarian account is also criticised16 for considering 
education as an educational good that individuals need ‘passively’ to receive for having the 
necessary or the minimum threshold for a digniﬁ ed life, for example, to function as equal 
among equals in, economic, political and social life.17 In short, Stojanov18 accuses the distri-
butive justice paradigm considering the child as totally responsible for his or her choices, if 
starting conditions are levelled. Th en he criticises the suﬃ  cientarian approach considering 
the child as totally non-autonomous and non-responsible under some threshold and trea-
ting children as autonomous and responsible when a suﬃ  cient threshold is reached.
Firstly, to reply more accurately the challenges of the justice in education, Stojanov ela-
borates the recognitive paradigm by referring to it as ‘the complete equality’. Th is means 
that it is not enough to grant everyone’s equal opportunities by ‘levelling the playing ﬁ eld’ 
or guaranteeing a certain threshold to everyone. Stojanov explains that educational justice 
means an inner dimension of social relations and the respectful treatment of all students, 
which is not reducible to an algorithm for a fair distribution of goods qua transferable 
objects. Stojanov treats education as an intrinsic good that requires a conception of justice 
that can evaluate curriculum development, assessment and validity of the interaction rela-
tions between teacher, students and fellow students. Th is position of the justice in educa-
tion underlines that the educational justice debates should supersede the perspectives of 
what individuals have or should have, and move towards how individuals are treated in the 
intersubjective relations of production and distribution of the goods. According to this line 
of thought the principles of justice should not be something abstractly given to people, but 
should result from the cooperative achievement of active subjects.19
Stojanov develops an idea according to which educational institutions should guarantee 
the development of autonomy for every student, where autonomy depends immediately 
and primarily on the quality of social relations. Stojanov conceptualises his idea of educati-
onal justice as ‘a notion of just pedagogies’ which focuses aﬃ  rmatively on the dimensions of 
empathy and cognitive respect. According to this idea, educational justice is the respectful 
15 Elisabeth Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117, no.4 (July 
2007): 595–622, https://doi.org/10.1086/518806. 
16 Harry Brighouse and Ingrid Robeyns. Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Th e Place of Educational Equality in Educational Justice,” 
in Education, justice and the human good. Fairness and equality in the education system, ed. Kirsten Meyer (Oxon, 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 14–34.
17 Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational migration,” 34–46; also Drerup, “Th e Politics of the Level Playing 
ﬁ eld,” 126.
18 Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egalitarianism,” 254–57; Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational 
migration,” 41–46; also Dietrich Benner, Allgemeine Pädagogik, 65–66, 201; Axel Honneth, Th e I in We. Studies in 
the Th eory of recognition. (UK, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012): 45–47; Rainer Forst, Justice, Democracy and the Right 
to Justiﬁ cation. Rainer Forst in Dialogue. (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 13.
19 Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egalitarianism,” 254–57.
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treatment of all students, where on the one hand the feelings and ideals of all children are 
supported by empathy (the actuality of children), and on the other, the future potential of 
all children to articulate conceptually these ideals, feelings and experiences are aﬃ  rmed by 
respect (the potentiality of children).20
Axel Honneth’s elaborations of three forms of recognition deepens Stojanov’s idea of 
educational justice. More speciﬁ cally, educational justice theory should, according to Hon-
neth and Stojanov, evaluate the quality of pedagogical relations via three forms of recogni-
tion: love, rights and social esteem. Th e ﬁ rst form of recognition, love, or empathy, deﬁ ned as 
care and empathy in the sphere of the family, is the practice that generates self-conﬁ dence. 
Honneth describes how the experiences of love, care and empathy enable a person to trust 
his or her own body as a reliable source of signals about his or her own genuine needs. Self-
conﬁ dence is conﬁ dence to express one’s needs and desires without fear of being abando-
ned, and with a reciprocal understanding that others have similar needs. Love and empathy 
experienced in early childhood, enables a person to commit to aﬀ ective relations of love 
without pathologies and a corresponding ability to  refuse distorted forms of love relations 
e.g. masochism and sadism.21
Furthermore, Honneth’s normative reconstruction of institutionalised form of fri-
endships qualiﬁ es the ﬁ rst form of recognition.22 Honneth describes how the historical 
development of modern friendships produced the ‘rules of friendships’ that Hegel descri-
bed in his idea of being ‘with oneself in the other.’ According to this idea, friendship, at its 
best, can teach one to perceive other people as a condition of one’s own freedom. Indivi-
duals learn in friendships to understand that they (as friends) mutually complement each 
other and the other is not a limitation, but a condition of one’s own freedom. According 
to Honneth, children learn intuitively to master the rules of friendship, reciprocity, esteem, 
empathy, care and sympathy in their early puberty.23 Th ey learn exactly the perspective 
of the other and putting him or herself in the other’s place – abilities so crucial for the 
development of autonomy and for cognitive understanding of the world. Honneth claims 
quite radically that ‘recognition comes before cognition,’ by which he means that love is 
necessary also for cognitive development.24
Honneth adds that the intuitive learning of friendships requires the educative support of 
schools. According to Honneth, the cultivation of the rules of friendships is one of the most 
important tasks of schools – schools need ‘to acquire a reliable sense of what it means to 
20 Honneth, Th e Struggle for Recognition, 105–6; Jessica Benjamin, Th e Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and 
the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 65, Chapter 2.
21 Honneth, Freedom’s Right. Th e Social Foundations of Democratic Life (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 138–139.
22 Honnneth, Freedom’s Right, 138.
23 Honneth, “Reiﬁ cation and Recognition: A New Look at an Old Idea,” in Reiﬁ cation: A new look at an old idea, eds. 
Judith Butler, Raymond Geuss, Martin Jay and Jonathan Lear, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
40; similarly Stojanov, Bildungsgerechtigkeit, Chapter 5.
24 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere,” 28; also Émile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the 
Th eory & Application of the Sociology of Education (New York: Free Press, 1973), 207–23.
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treat fellow pupils as equal partners in a shared process of learning and inquiry.’25 Honneth 
conceives Amy Guttmann’s idea of the ‘associative morality’26 as an applicable method to 
implement the idea of ‘friendships’ in schools. According to associative morality, students 
should be encouraged into a culture of association, which means the communicative prac-
tices fostering moral initiative and the ability to take up the perspectives of others, rather 
than a rote learning of moral principles or blind obedience to moral authority.
It is important to note that Honneth assesses all the spheres of social freedom – per-
sonal relations, markets and democracy – and how well these spheres enable individuals 
to perceive other persons as a fulﬁ lment of their own freedom and how well these sphe-
res enable everyone’s free self-realisation. Th is, ‘need for completion’, should be fulﬁ lled in 
every spheres of social freedom.27
Th e second form of recognition, rights enabling self-respect, means that individuals 
should learn to understand that everyone is equally endowed with the same liberties and 
moral capabilities, i.e., morally responsible, conscientious and capable of moral delibera-
tion. In this point Honneth28 agrees with Rawls that Rawls’ theory of justice is a good indi-
cator of how important formal rights are for the development of self-respect. Self-respect 
means the capacity for a conception of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice.29 
What opposes Honneth’s position from Rawls’ is that Honneth is much more cautious 
about the edifying functions of rights and morality. Honneth considers rights and morality 
as only one part of justice, not its entirety.30 Furthermore, Honneth’s paradigmatic examp-
les of social pathologies,31 in the spheres of rights and morality, in his Freedom’s right, can 
clarify this diﬀ erence and enlighten us to the limitation of rights and morality when applied 
as pedagogical contents.
In the case of rights, teachers in a school could bear in mind how individualistic inte-
rests, or selﬁ sh aims, so natural to a child32 can cause social pathologies in a form of negative 
freedom. Honneth describes how individual rights (e.g. proprietary rights and social rights) 
can promote attitudes and practices that block the exercise of the kind of freedom these 
rights promise. Individual rights, necessary for individuals, stymies their imbedded free-
doms if they are used only as a monological space to escape the network of communicative 
25 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere,” 28; Amy Gutmann, Democratic education: 
with a new preface and epilogue (New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1999) 59–64; cf. John Rawls, A 
Th eory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 467–472.
26 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 44–45; Timo Jütten, “Is the Market a Sphere of Social Freedom?,” Critical Horizons 16, no. 
2 (May 2015): 187–203, https://doi.org/10.1179/1440991715Z.00000000047.
27 Miriam Bankovsky “Social justice: Defending Rawls’ theory of justice against Honneth’s objections,” Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 37, no. 1(Jan 2011), 95–118, https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453710384363; Honneth, “Th e Limits of 
Liberalism: On the Political-Ethical Discussion On Communitarianism,” Th esis Eleven 28, no. 1 (Feb 1991): 27–9, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/072551369102800103.
28 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 18–9. 
29 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 69–113; Also Bankovsky “Social justice,” 104–112.
30 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 86–95, 113–121.
31 Kant, On Education, 5–7.
32 Kant, On Education, 5–7, 28–29.
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action and free the self from all normative obligations. In this case, the ethical reﬂ exion of 
one’s interest and aims through intersubjective conversations, (e.g. political rights) becomes 
unfeasible.33 Honneth’s analyses show how negative freedom in the forms of rights is not 
enough for a child to critically evaluate the existing conditions or improve them.
In the case of morality, Honneth’s studies support the idea that the task of teachers 
and schools is to encourage children to think for themselves.34 An ability to think for 
oneself helps one to understand that other people are endowed with this same ability. 
Schools should therefore encourage children to think and to understand the perspective 
of the generalised other.35 Honneth applies this (Mead’s) idea of the generalised other, which 
implies that children understand that moral norms are legitimate only if all involved can 
equally and freely accept and evaluate the shared norms. Th is would require that everyone 
understand each other as equal co-authors of the mutually-binding moral norms and, in 
addition, learn to respect each other as an end in themselves. In other words, this means an 
ability to take the perspective of the other and to put oneself in the other’s place.36
However, morality can ‘invite’ social pathologies whenever the moral principles are 
rigidly applied. Honneth refers to Kant’s the categorical imperative37 and argues that if this 
universalistic norm is applied without taking into account individuals’ social relations it 
leads to social pathology. According to Honneth the categorical imperative requires that 
in a conﬂ ict situation individuals should be able to abstract themselves from the social 
meaning of the relationships in which they are always already involved.38 Th is means that 
for the sake of neutrality, in the conﬂ ict situation individuals should be able to ignore what 
it means to have personal social attachments at all. Honneth emphasises that this kind of 
social detachment leads to social pathologies, because individuals are unable to detach 
themselves from or take the neutral position in a conﬂ ict situation - for example, to detach 
themselves from the meanings of personal relations, constitutional norms, and parent-
hood.39
Drawing on Honneth’s arguments, this paper concludes that teachers should be sen-
sitive in moral education. Th e moral understanding practiced in schools should teach 
and enable gradually all students to commit themselves to the shared values that they, 
by their own standards, can perceive as reasonable and to reject unreasonable demands, 
33 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 81–95.
34 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 109–120; Kant, On Education, 83–94; John Dewey, Jo Ann Boydston, Patricia Baysinger, 
and Barbara Levine. Th e Middle Works of John Dewey: 1899-1924. Volume 9, Democracy and Education, 1916 (Car-
bondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), 167.
35 Honneth, Th e Struggle for Recognition, 107–21; Mead, George, Herbert and Morris, Charles, William, Mind, Self and 
Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 174–208.
36 Honneth, “Reiﬁ cation and Recognition,” 41–9.
37 Immanuel Kant, Allen W. Wood, and Jerome B. Schneewind. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), xviii. 
38 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 109–110, 128; Honneth in his “Th e Limits of Liberalism,” 21, refers to Michael Sandel’s 
idea that subjects are always ‘radically situated.’
39 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 178–190; Honneth, Th e Idea of Socialism (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2016), 66–71.
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social institutions, and precarious circumstances that cannot meet the consent of all those 
aﬀ ected. However, this potential for freedom is abbreviated if the universal moral perspec-
tive violates personal relations or democratic will-formation. Th us, rigid moral perspective 
can lead to isolation and a loss of communication.
Honneth deﬁ nes the third form of recognition, social esteem, as intersubjective action 
in the sphere of work, where individuals learn to value their traits and abilities by taking 
into account how these traits may help with developing the traits and abilities of others. 
Honneth underlines that if the norms of rights and social esteem would determine the 
market economy, it would completely transform itself into a shared cooperative enterprise 
where ‘actors are not solely working together but work for each other.’40 Honneth explains 
how schools can cultivate social esteem. According to Honneth schools should be organi-
zed like cooperative communities where everyone can act as a recognized member in con-
cert with all others, for the purpose of joint decision-making. Th is would entail practices 
where children learn to perceive each other’s contributions, talents and abilities as useful 
for the whole class or, for example, to shared projects. In other words, it is with cooperative 
learning that pupils actively participate in all the school’s aﬀ airs. Similarly, Durkheim argues 
that in school a child should become aware that he is working for everyone and that eve-
ryone is working for him.41
Honneth argues that this kind of school should use communal rather than individu-
alized kinds of criticism and encouragements, which means that the punishments and 
rewards used in the classroom should be accepted by all. Honneth refers to Durkheim 
and Dewey, elaborating that social esteem develops not through hard moral discipline, but 
rather a process of aﬀ ective habituation, i.e. by the socialization of pupils as early as pos-
sible to acquire the spirit of democratic cooperation. According to these views, positively 
experienced initial habituation and participation in practices that are adequate to a child’s 
inclinations, enhance a child’s later learning of democratic-decision making.42
Honneth describes in a similar way the role of a child in the family. Honneth states that 
a child should be involved as early as possible and as much as possible as an active partici-
pant in the family’s decision-making. Moreover, if children can see themselves in the family 
as active ‘competent’ participants and emotionally accepted as irreplaceable being43 by the 
other members of the family, their own free will, will develop better than through the aut-
horitarian educational measures. Honneth explains that parents, for example, should not 
40 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere,” 26–28; Durkheim, Moral education, 235–249.
41 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere,” 27; Durkheim, Moral education, 235–249.
42 Heikki Ikäheimo, ”Making Th e Best What We Are: Recognition as an Ontological and Ethical Concept,” in Th e 
Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, eds. Schmidt am Busch, Hans-Christoph, and 
Christopher F. Zurn. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 350–53.
43 Honneth, Freedom’s Right, 163–66.
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make decisions over the heads of their child, but adopt a negotiating attitude and actively 
involve a child in the decisions concerning his or her own life.44
Th e second aspect, which the idea of justice in education should be capable of dealing 
with, is with recognising unjust and autonomy-undermining practices in education. Stoja-
nov develops his idea of ‘complete equality’ and ‘just pedagogics’ with the argument that 
all educational inequalities, i.e. educational practices of discrimination or unequal treat-
ment of children are unjust. He focuses on certain types of inequality, or epistemic injustice. 
Stojanov contends that since education is mainly about the transmission and growth of 
knowledge, Miranda Fricker’s two forms of epistemic injustice ‘testimonial injustice’ and 
‘hermeneutical injustice’ are well suited to capturing educational injustice in schools. When 
elaborating epistemic injustice, Stojanov innovatively combines Honneth’s categories of 
misrecognition, lack of empathy, discrimination or exclusion and degradation, to concepts 
of epistemic injustice.45
Firstly, the testimonial injustice appears in situations where the subjects’ credibility is 
valued on the basis of who the individuals are, or what they represents, and not what they 
actually know or have the potential for. Stojanov explains that in an educational context 
these are the cases in which less credibility is given to students of a lower social and cul-
tural status, despite the possibility that their ability to gain and produce knowledge could 
be equal to or even greater than that of middle-class students. According to testimonial 
injustice a child’s learning ability (Bildsamkeit) and knowledge-related credibility is eva-
luated in accordance with his/her family socialisation and acculturation. In other words, 
the quality of a child’s culture and socialization are subjected to discriminatory evaluation. 
Stojanov further states that testimonial injustice corresponds exactly to the ﬁ rst and the 
second forms of Honneth’s misrecognition, lack of empathy and denial of rights. Testimo-
nial injustice represents the lack of empathy towards the student’s beliefs and biographical 
experiences and, denial of rights to participate in the process of knowledge production and 
to become a potential ‘knower.’46 In Honneth’s words, these forms of injustice prevent a 
student from becoming a competent participant in democratic decision-making ‘without 
fear of shame’.47
Secondly, hermeneutical injustice occurs when there are no publicly recognised and 
developed concepts capable of adequately articulating the experiences, aspirations, and 
44 Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational migration,” 42–3; Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egali-
tarianism,” 257–60; Honneth, Struggle for Recognition, 131–39; Fricker, Epistemic Injustice, Chapters 3, 9.
45 Stojanov, “Educational justice and transnational migration,” 42–3; Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egali-
tarianism,” 257–60. 
46 Fricker, Epistemic injustice, 145.
47 Honneth, “Education and the Democratic Public Sphere,” 31–2; Honneth (2007, 88) in one of his earlier articles 
remarkably touches on cultural exclusion. He refers to Foucault’s three forms of exclusion as three taboos, on the 
certain topics of the conversation, rituals of circumstance and the privileges of the speaking subject. Th ese three ele-
ments of discrimination (‘three types of prohibition’) identiﬁ ed bv Foucault would actually capture more nuanced 
forms of epistemic injustice (than Fricker’s categories) that are transmitted in schools and in the diﬀ erent forums 
of the socialisation processes.
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achievements of the members of marginalised groups. Th is means, for example, that the 
dominant language used in educational institutions contains insuﬃ  cient concepts to 
express the multi-cultural and multi-lingual socialization of students from immigrant fami-
lies as an educational potential. Stojanov argues that in this case educational authorities 
place these students in cultural boxes, reducing their distinctive subjectivity to manifestati-
ons of a single ‘foreign culture.’ Stojanov states that empirical studies show how immigrant 
students often feel that it is very diﬃ  cult for them to ﬁ nd verbal means in the form of pub-
licly recognised concepts with which to defend themselves against cultural stereotyping 
and recognise the neglect of their speciﬁ c knowledge and abilities in schools.48
Stojanov concludes that the testimonial and hermeneutical injustice correlates with the 
forms of misrecognition, lack of respect, social esteem and empathy. Th ese forms of neglect 
can cause profound psychological suﬀ ering, damaging the self-conﬁ dence, self-respect and 
self-esteem of a student and representing a serious educational injustice that will hinder the 
student’s ability to learn. Stojanov stresses that the elimination of all inequalities between 
students’ levels of knowledge and social opportunities is not in the control of schools. It 
would be a utopian goal. Th is notwithstanding, educational institutions would become 
just if they would treat all students with equal respect, without internally producing epi-
stemic injustice.49
Pedagogical critics of justice in education
Epistemic injustice, introduced by Stojanov, seems a highly topical and concrete problem 
that schools face today. Th is paper aims not to diminish in any way experiences of educati-
onal injustices, but considers that could there exist negatively experienced educative sum-
mons that are out of the scope of the categories of epistemic injustice and misrecognition, 
but highly relevant for the idea of justice in education.
Dietrich Benner‘s recent article ‘Über Anerkennung und Macht’50 (About Recognition 
and Power) oﬀ ers signiﬁ cant content dealing with this point. Firstly, this chapter introduces 
Benner’s argument51 according to which in pedagogical contexts there is not only an issue of 
giving mutual recognition and withholding it, but rather pedagogic action is always a fabric 
of educative practices where recognitive and supportive counter-measures (Gegenwirken-
den Erziehung) are created and where misrecognitive education plays a novel role. Benner 
argues further that educatively-mediated Bildungs-processes do not take place through a 
general intergenerational exchange of experiences, but through positive and negative expe-
riences that educators produce. Benner states that the educator in some cases must stir 
negative experiences in order to enhance the learning processes. In these cases, educators 
48 Honneth, Th e Struggle for Recognition, 92–131; Stojanov, “Educational Justice as Respect Egalitarianism,” 259.
49 Dietrich Benner, “Über Anerkennung,“ 139–55.
50 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,”, 141, 147–50.
51 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,”, 141–42.
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do not expressly recognize the adolescent’s judgments and actions but tend to disapprove 
of these initial and unﬁ nished thoughts and actions of an immature being. Benner clariﬁ es 
that these pedagogical counter measures that enhance students’ reﬂ ection and changes in 
their behaviour are not triggered by positive forms of recognition, but by misrecognition 
and consequent negative experiences.52
An example of a productive process of this kind of denial of recognition could be the 
case of a young neo-Nazi blaming his teacher and society for not oﬀ ering any recognition 
of his self-esteem and self-respect when being a neo-Nazi.53 In this case, the educator’s and 
(society’s) disrespect or disapproval of a neo-Nazi and neo-Nazism (and other democracy-
demeaning values) are legitimate, ﬁ rst, because the neo-Nazi has false evaluative beliefs 
about the value of his particular identity and self-realisation possibilities54 and, second, 
because his values and actions are disrespecting and violating other’s freedom. Th e tea-
cher’s counter-educational measures – for example, the habituation of this student in the 
classroom with students from the diﬀ erent cultural backgrounds – might lead to reﬂ ection 
and development in the neo-Nazi student to the point of abandoning his racial, inhumane 
and democracy-demeaning ideologies of Nazism. Th ese teacher’s actions come close to 
Honneth’s deﬁ nitions of democratic education, according to which the diversiﬁ ed associa-
tions of friendships would be an eﬀ ective way for increasing tolerance and reducing racism 
and denigration. Benner himself does not develop this example, and of course, there above 
case might lead to opposite results.
Benner extends his critique by claiming that the feeling of shame and negative morality 
play a diﬀ erent role than what Honneth attributes to these phenomena. Benner contends 
that when shame is considered pedagogically, its function becomes clear: shame genera-
tes negative experiences that are productive and educative interruptions in routine expe-
riences and which enhance thinking and inquiry in learners, enabling the abilities to be 
open for new experiences. Benner criticises Honneth’s deﬁ nition of shame exclusively as 
a negative feeling, serving as an indication for that person that norms of recognition are 
being violated. Violations of the norms of recognition lead to a reduction in self-conﬁ dence, 
self-respect and self-esteem; but this norm-based model does not analyse the productive 
elements of shame. Benner concludes that shame can be a positive indication of the inter-
ruptions or educational challenges (Bildungsgängen), where negative experiences create 
certain discontinuities which in turn support reﬂ exive transformations. Th is discontinuity 
spurs individuals to self-problematize their knowledge and ability; and through self-chal-
lenging, they become aware of their non-knowledge and non-abilities.55 
52 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,”, 141–42.
53 See Antti Kauppinen, ”Reason, recognition, and internal critique,” Inquiry, 45 no. 4 (Nov 2010), 489, https://doi.org
/10.1080/002017402320947568. 
54 cf. Honneth, “Democracy as reﬂ exive cooperation. John Dewey and the theory of democracy today,” Political 
Th eory 26 no. 6 (Dec 1998), 772, https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591798026006001.
55 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,”, 141–44; Benner, Bildungstheorie und Bildungsforschung. Grundlagenreﬂ exionen und 
Anwendungsfelder (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011) Chapt. 1, 176–83; Dewey, How We Th ink, 9–10, 65; 
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Secondly, this chapter elaborates Benner’s idea in which the various receptions of recog-
nitive educational justice theories56 tend to lose the elementary pedagogical conditions 
and requirements and inadequately grasp the legitimate educational authority. To clarify 
his argument, Benner cites from Kant. According to Benner’s citation “Man kann und muss 
Kindern in bestimmten Situationen das scharfe Messer aus der Hand nehmen und ihnen 
zugleich zeigen, dass sie dieses gebrauchen können, sobald sie die hierfür erforderlichen 
Geschicklichkeiten im Umgang mit weniger gefährlichen Instrumenten erworben haben.“ 
“In certain situations, one can and must take away the sharp knife from children’s hands 
and at the same time show them that they can use it as soon as they have acquired the 
necessary skills in dealing with less dangerous instruments.”57 Benner argues that always 
(and also in this case) when a child’s freedom is limited the educator cannot be sure that 
his or her actions will not lead to unintended side eﬀ ects and unwanted results, e.g. to 
fears or subjugation. Benner argues that it is not enough to examine the conﬂ icts of recog-
nition and power, but that there should be empirical explorations of the facts associated 
with pedagogical authority.58 In other words, the categorisations of power and recognition 
seem insuﬃ  cient for an educator to empirically explore the facts and results of pedagogic 
compulsion.
To further this aspect, Benner refers to Th eodor Litt’s work Naturwissenschaft und 
Menschenbildung (Th e natural sciences and human bildung) where Litt systematically ela-
borates the method of natural sciences and the triad of subject, (S), method, (M), and object 
(O).59 Litt criticises this natural scientiﬁ c model of knowledge formation as inapplicable 
for an hermeneutic and humanistic tradition of educational sciences when there is insuf-
ﬁ ciently conceived hermeneutic life-world experiences. However, Benner argues that when 
a pedagogically-legitimate authority is assessed, the knowledge formation and its methods 
should then be critically analysed. Th e subject, method and object can then be understood 
as the basic components of ‘pedagogical knowledge’ and these elements should be analy-
sed from the perspective of a teacher, the students and the pedagogical content. Benner 
states that this is similar with the science-propaedeutic teaching (den wissenschafts-propä-
deutischen Unterricht), i.e. the preparatory teaching for scientiﬁ c thinking in schools.60 Th is 
teaching does not omit the methodological processes and the world contents contained 
in the curricular subjects. Benner stresses that preparatory teaching for scientiﬁ c thinking 
explicitly aims to address the implications of power and recognition in teaching and the 
English, Discontinuity, 87–96.
56 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 150; Benner criticises more speciﬁ cally the pedagogical application of the recogni-
tion theory; but this same criticism applies to recognitive educational justice paradigm.   
57 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 148.
58 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 148.
59 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 148; Th eodor Litt, Naturwissenschaft und Menschenbildung (Heidelberg: Quelle & 
Meyer, 1968), 53–75.
60 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 148; e.g. Stefan Hahn, “Wissenschaftspropädeutik in der gymnasialen Oberstufe,“ in 
Standardisierung in der gymnasialen Oberstufe, eds. Bosse D., Eberle F., Schneider-Taylor B (Springer VS, Wiesbaden, 
2013), 161–174, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-00658-7_10.
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research of teaching. Th is teaching should make tangible, achievable and reﬂ ective to every 
student, the diversiﬁ ed variety of the methods, and the objects of the modern forms of 
knowledge.
Conclusion
Th e main research problem of this paper was to determine how well Stojanov’s and Hon-
neth’s recognitive justice paradigm responds to the demands of justice in education. Th is 
paper drew out from the deﬁ nitions of justice in education the most relevant problems: to 
what degree can we hold a child (an immature being) as responsible for their actions, and 
what can and should be demanded and expected from a child for the sake of educational 
justice? In other words, how can justice in education evaluate autonomy-facilitating and 
autonomy-inhibiting educational practices?
Th e ﬁ rst part of this paper showed that Stojanov, with his ideas of ‘complete equality’ 
and ‘just pedagogies’, oﬀ ers high standards for justice in education. It implies that educatio-
nal justice is the respectful treatment of all students - where on the one hand, the feelings 
and ideals of all children are supported by empathy; and on the other, the potential of all 
children to articulate conceptually these ideals, feelings and experiences are aﬃ  rmed by 
respect.
Th is paper extended Stojanov’s perspectives by examining further Honneth’s forms of 
recognition and the idea of friendship. Th is examination aimed to respond more speciﬁ -
cally to how children, as immature beings, are encouraged and educated towards compe-
tency according to the recognitive paradigm. Th is section of the paper resulted in the idea 
that children need to learn to understand other subjects not as limits, but as conditions 
for their own freedom. Th e example of subjects learning to treat each other in friendships 
would be a ﬁ tting example of this.
Th en an examination of rights contributed to the idea that schools must teach children 
to think for themselves. Th is requires an awareness of the shared perspective of ‘the gene-
ralised other’, which, according to Honneth, consists of rights and morality. Th is part of the 
paper elicited also Honneth’s ideas how rights and morality can generate social pathologies. 
Th ese pathologies characterise the negative experiences that might be transmitted unin-
tentionally. Th is is one perspective that Benner ignores in his critics. More speciﬁ cally, Hon-
neth in his Freedom’s right has conceptualised social pathologies (in rights and morality) 
and social misdevelopments (in the area of social freedom) which both crucially amends 
Honneth’s position. Benner’s argument, that recognition theory is unable to analyse unin-
tended consequences of pedagogical compulsion, partly loses its sharpness by ignoring the 
forms of pathologies that Honneth has recently developed. Th is aspect cannot be develo-
ped in detail here, but it indicates that the recognition theory has more diversiﬁ ed concep-
tual tools to examine intentional and unintentional pedagogical acts than Benner assumes.
Th is paper then proceeded to analyse Honneth’s idea of social esteem, relying mainly 
on Honneth’s educational writing, to clarify how it could be cultivated in schools. Th ese 
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elaborations bring out one particular problem related with the speciﬁ c criteria of justice 
in education: the capacity to diﬀ erentiate the responsibilities of family and school. Hon-
neth seems to link, on the practical level (in the implementation of democratic education 
in schools and in family) quite one-sidedly love and democratic decision-making (i.e. love 
to the justice-related area). One could challenge this view with the argument that justice 
and democratic-decision making are not the highest good within families, but families are 
embedded with love, care and a number of other values. Th ere is not necessarily so direct a 
connection between the aﬀ ectual relations of care and love to the development of demo-
cratic decision-making. Th is paper concludes on an initial suspicion61 that when Honneth 
connects the idea of love and friendship with the idea of democratic self-legislation, it 
somewhat blurs the diﬀ erence between the upbringing practiced in family and education 
in schools. Recognition theory therefore does not oﬀ er a clear way for deciding how to 
separate responsibilities of family and school.
It was concluded from Stojanov’s arguments that recognitive justice condemns all kinds 
of educational inequalities and educational practices of discrimination and unequal tre-
atment of children. Stojanov’s analyses of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice 
show concretely how the forms of misrecognition in education cause educational inequa-
lities. However, it is noted here that Honneth’s earlier studies of Foucault’s ideas of cultural 
exclusion could oﬀ er more versatile ways for examining epistemic injustice.62 Further studies 
of Honneth’s63 citations on Foucault’s three kinds of procedures of exclusion and Bourdieu’s 
idea of the symbolic violence practiced in schools would signiﬁ cantly extend Stojanov’s con-
templations. If epistemic injustice could include these (Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s) ideas, it 
could oﬀ er highly relevant content for further studies – not only for the pedagogical rela-
tions of teachers and students, but also for the institution as a whole. Educational systems, 
for example, can be organised (unintentionally) to reproduce these inequalities when pro-
moting and guiding immigrant students to the fast and (the cost-eﬃ  cient) educational 
paths in lower status manual work and not suggesting or encouraging them to consider 
higher education and thus higher career possibilities.
61 Th is is only an initial suspicion because Honneth (2015, 23) quite clearly argues that the democratic state must 
control the schools (the demands and interests of parents must not cross the thresholds of school) to ensure the 
reproduction of democratic values, such as, tolerance, empathy and a concern for the common good. Honneth 
(2015, 24-25) clariﬁ es that a democratic constitutional state has the task of providing educational opportunities 
that will equally enable each of its future citizens to participate in the public legitimation of his or her own choices, 
without fear of shame. However, Honneth does not develop this line of argument further and oﬀ ers no distinction 
between the methods of democratic education in family or in schools, but their role from the aspect of educatio-
nal action remains the same. 
62 Honneth, Disrespect. Th e Normative Foundations of Critical Th eory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 80–97; Hon-
neth, Th e Critique of Power. Reﬂ ective Stages in a Critical Social Th eory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Th e MIT Press, 
1991), 99–176.
63 Axel Honneth, Disrespect, 86–8; Michel Foucault, Th e Order of Th ings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences 
(London: Tavistock Publication, 1970), 7; Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, and Richard Nice, Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Culture. (London: Sage, 1990).
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Th e second chapter of this paper examined Benner’s critique of recognition theory. Th is 
analysis discussed how the legitimate pedagogical authority might occur diﬀ erently from 
recognition theory. Th e pedagogical ‘corrective acts’ seems to be richer in concepts than 
those of the recognitive justice paradigm. Examination of Benner’s critique resulted in the 
important argument that educators need sometimes to produce discontinuities and cer-
tain kinds of negative experiences in student’s rudimentary habits and thinking. Benner 
convincingly argues that negativity and shame have a diﬀ erent role what Honneth has 
attributed to these phenomena. However, this paper concludes that one needs to be very 
cautious about producing feelings of shame in pedagogic action, because beside produc-
tive interruptions there are (shame-based) destructive interruptions that will hinder the 
learner’s capacity for self-cultivation and transformation. While Benner has systematically 
developed his idea of negative morality64 these elaborations do not contradict the fact 
that the forms of misrecognition are crucial maltreatment, the ultimate line that educator 
should never cross, or actions that educator should never implement. From this chapter, 
the conclusion is drawn that if recognitive justice is to be applied to explain educational 
inequality, further analysis should be conducted to clarify the distinction between the 
productive and destructive negative experiences inﬂ uencing the learner’s capacity for self-
cultivation and transformation.65 Th is requires more speciﬁ ed conceptual clariﬁ cations 
between diﬀ erent forms of misrecognition, ideological recognition, social pathologies and 
misdevelopments.66
Th e second critical claim, advanced by Benner, is far more complicated than the ﬁ rst. 
Benner argues that when examining pedagogical authority, the focus should be on the 
‘research of the pedagogical knowledge’ (Erforschung des pädagogischen Wissens) and on 
the diversity of its forms. Benner mentions this as being somewhat similar with ‘the pre-
paratory teaching in the scientiﬁ c thinking’ in schools (den wissenschaftspropädeutischen 
Unterricht).67 In this teaching the relations between the subject, (a student), the method 
and object, (the forms of knowledge) should all be critically assessed from the point of view 
of teacher, student and pedagogical content that the methodological processes and the 
world content in the curricular subjects would become tangible and reﬂ ective for every 
student. Th is can be expressed in diﬀ erently with Levinson’s arguments according to which 
educational justice needs to take place on multiple levels. According to Levinson, the aims 
and practices of education should be analysed from classroom activities (micro-level), from 
64 Benner, Bildungstheorie, Chapt. 1, 176–83; Benner, Allgemeine, Chapter 5.
65 Also Jörg Schaub, “Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions: Normative Reconstruction as 
Method of Critical Th eory,” Critical Horizons 16 no.2 (May 2015) 107–130, https://doi.org/10.1179/14409917
15Z.00000000043;   English, Discontinuity, 17–21.
66 Also Arto Laitinen and  Arvi Särkelä, “Four conceptions of social pathology,” European Journal of Social Th eory 22, 
no. 1 (2019), 80–102, https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431018769593.
67 Benner, “Über Anerkennung,” 148.
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the point of view of the school and district (meso-level) and from the relations between 
school and society (macro-level).68
Th e accusation69 that Honneth’s recognition theory omits these elementary pedagogical 
requirements partly misses its target. Honneth’s intention is to develop the methodologi-
cal and theoretical grounds for a critical theory which can analyse the social inequalities 
of modern capitalism. To elicit these social deviations the elaborations of intact subjectiv-
ity development (self-conﬁ dence, self-respect and self-esteem) has been necessary for com-
paring healthy self-relations with the pathological ones (produced by modern societies). 
Furthermore, Honneth’s position can be defended by arguing that Benner ignores in his 
criticism Honneth’s inﬂ uential writings Freedom’s right and Th e Idea of Socialism. Th e cru-
cial point that Benner misses is in the historical understanding, (developed in Freedom’s 
right and the Idea of socialism), according to which negativity is not based solely on indi-
viduals’ or collectives’ (like proletariats’) contingent negative experiences of misrecognition. 
Rather, Honneth argues that freedom develops through ‘institutional breakthroughs’ of 
social freedom - ‘breakthroughs in existing institutions, in altered legal structures and sifts 
in mentality that cannot longer be rolled back.’70 Benner’s71 criticism of Honneth is that the 
societal demands, conﬂ icts and interests should not be contained or harmonised by the 
forms of recognition. Benner further argues that instead of recognitive order there should 
be experimental research aiming to reconcile (to non-hierarchically organised whole) the 
demands of the spheres of labour markets, economy, morality, politics, education, media, 
art, and religion. Th is paper concludes, that for a better understanding of justice in educa-
tion (in its micro, meso and macro-levels) Benner’s and Honneth’s theories are important 
and need further, extensive research. Th e examinations of the historical breakthroughs 
in the family, the market economy and democracy would deﬁ nitely contribute to and 
enrichen the elementary pedagogical requirements and, furthermore, valorise how social 
reality is developing towards a non-hierarchical order which is one of the crucial prerequi-
sites for justice in education.72
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